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Abstract 
In three studies, we investigated whether and to what extent the evaluation of two mutually 
exclusive hypotheses is affected by a feature-positive effect, wherein present clues are weighted 
more than absent clues. Participants (N = 126) were presented with abstract problems concerning 
the most likely provenance of a card that was drawn from one of two decks. We factored the correct 
response (the hypothesis favored by the consideration of all clues) and the ratio of present-to-absent 
features in each set of observations. Furthermore, across the studies, we manipulated the 
presentation format of the features’ probabilities by providing the probability distributions of 
occurrences (Study 1), non-occurrences (Study 3) or both (Study 2). In all studies, both participant 
preference and accuracy were mostly determined by an over-reliance on present features. Moreover, 
across participants, both confidence in the responses and the informativeness of the present clues 
correlated positively with the number of responses given in line with an exclusive consideration of 
present features. These results were mostly independent of both the rarity of the absent clues and 
the presentation format. We concluded that the feature-positive effect influences hypothesis 
evaluation, and we discussed the implications for confirmation bias. 
 
 
 
Keywords: the feature-positive effect; hypothesis testing; rarity effect; information sensitivity; 
confirmation bias. 
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Missing the dog that failed to bark in the nighttime: 
On the overestimation of occurrences over non-occurrences in hypothesis testing 
Feature-positive effects refer to the predisposition of human beings and other animals to pay 
more heed to the occurrences of stimuli rather than to their non-occurrences (e.g., Jenkins & 
Sainsbury, 1969; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980). It has been conjectured that feature-positive 
effects are an adaptation to a typical information pattern, whereby the occurrences of particular 
features are relatively rare compared to their non-occurrences, and thus they are, from a very 
general perspective, more informative (Newman et al., 1980). Once consolidated, this tendency to 
overrate the presence of stimuli may also generalize to those contexts in which the presence of 
certain stimuli does not necessarily convey more information than their absence. The present study 
investigates whether and to what extent people overrate the information value of present vs. absent 
features when they evaluate alternative hypotheses, that is, when they determine which of two 
mutually exclusive hypotheses is most likely in light of available data. This issue might have 
relevant practical consequences in professions in which accurate belief revision is critically 
important, for example, for judges who have to infer a verdict from different clues (e.g., Wells & 
Lindsay, 1980) or physicians who must formulate a diagnosis. For instance, in a patient with 
symptoms of hyperthyroidism, the assessment of normal ocular objectivity conveys the same 
diagnostic value as the reading of the absence of exophthalmos: Both clues should lead a physician 
towards a diagnosis of a form of non-Basedow thyreopathy (Scandellari, 2005). If physicians 
systematically underestimate the relevance of absent signs, however, the diagnostic importance of 
the absence of exophthalmos would be underestimated, resulting in weaker than warranted 
diagnostic hypotheses. 
The issue of a feature-positive effect in the evaluation stage of hypothesis development is 
important also from a theoretical standpoint for cognitive psychology, because many scholars argue 
that positive testing, a quite common and spontaneous hypothesis-testing strategy, might result in 
confirmation bias if combined with feature-positive effects at the hypothesis-evaluation stage (e.g., 
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Klayman, 1995; McKenzie, 2004, 2006). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no direct empirical 
evidence has ever corroborated the idea that present clues are rated as more important than absent 
clues when alternative hypotheses are evaluated. In fact, “It remains to be seen to what degree 
feature-positive effects occur in hypothesis evaluation” (McKenzie, 2006, p. 587).  
Overview of previous literature 
Feature-positive effects were described in several domains. The studies of discrimination 
learning (e.g., Hearst & Wolff, 1989; Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1970; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980) 
have shown that the ability to discriminate between two stimuli that differ only by the presence or 
absence of a feature is acquired more rapidly and correctly when the feature is present on positive 
trials rather than on negative trials. In the visual perception literature, it has long been demonstrated 
that there are search asymmetries when the targets are characterized by the presence rather than the 
absence of a unique feature relative to the distractors. Specifically, it has been shown that visual 
search is faster when the target-defining feature is present in the target compared to when it is 
absent (Neisser, 1963; Treisman & Souther, 1985).  
Similar effects were observed at increasingly higher levels of cognitive processing. The 
presence of characteristics is more relevant than their absence in the learning of concepts. The 
acquisition of a concept is easier for people when they receive positive instances (i.e., information 
about what the concept is) rather than negative instances (i.e., information of what it is not) (Bourne 
& Guy, 1968; Hovland & Weiss, 1953; Klayman, 1995; Nahinsky & Slaymaker, 1970). In 
probability learning, people tend to make their predictions on the basis of the relative frequency of 
the occurrence of different categories of stimuli, instead of on the basis of the actual probability of 
each type of stimulus because the latter would require the accurate recall of trials in which the 
stimulus did not occur (Estes, 1976). In yet another domain, when evaluating two-way contingency 
tables, people weigh the co-occurrences of stimuli more than the instances in which one or both of 
the stimuli is absent, a phenomenon labeled cell weight inequality (e.g., Beyth-Marom, 1982; 
Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998). Although it might be 
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argued that this tendency is normatively adequate when the stimuli are rare (McKenzie & 
Mikkelsen, 2007), in other contexts it inflates illusory correlations (e.g., Mandel & Lehman, 1998; 
Smedslund, 1963). 
In hypothesis testing, which is the main focus of interest of the present study, it is well 
known that, when gathering information for checking whether a hypothesis is true or false, there is a 
moderate to strong tendency to adopt a positive testing strategy (Baron, Bettie & Hershey, 1988; 
Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010; Klayman, 1995; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Skov 
& Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Wason, 
1960). Positive testing, in its current understanding, affects the gathering, as opposed to the 
evaluation, of information. It consists of a tendency to preferentially look for the occurrence of 
features that are more probable when the tested hypothesis is true than when it is false. The 
occurrence of those features strengthens (namely, inductively confirms) the tested hypothesis, 
whereas their non-occurrence weakens (i.e., inductively falsifies) it. It is easy to see the possible 
consequences of a feature-positive effect in the evaluation stage of hypothesis testing, for 
individuals adopting positivity as a strategy in information-gathering. First, features whose 
occurrence might verify the hypothesis are searched for; second, if such confirming features indeed 
occur, they are attended and considered; conversely, if they do not occur, the corresponding 
falsification of the hypothesis could be neglected or underestimated. The result could be the 
systematic, improper apportionment of excessive confidence in the truth of the tested hypothesis, 
namely a confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995; McKenzie, 2004, 2007; Nickerson, 1998). 
There is little empirical evidence for or against the occurrence of a feature-positive effect in 
the evaluation stage of hypothesis testing. Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom listed the effect as a typical 
deviation from a correct Bayesian evaluation of a hypothesis: “In principle, people can ignore the 
likelihood ratio just as well as the base rate [...]. This may happen, for example, when the datum [...] 
reports a non-occurrence. A classic example of the latter is Sherlock Holmes’s observation (Doyle, 
1974) that his colleague, Inspector Gregory, had not considered the significance of a dog failing to 
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bark when an intruder approached.” (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983, p. 246). However, the 
authors did not report empirical evidence in support of the existence and magnitude of such a 
tendency apart from the anecdotic reference to Arthur Conan Doyle’s tale. Screening the relevant 
literature, we found many references to the possibility that non-occurrences are underestimated in 
the evaluation stage of hypothesis testing (e.g., Klayman, 1995; McKenzie, 2004, 2006; Nickerson, 
1998; Slowiaczek et al., 1992), but the empirical evidence is very scant. For example, in their work 
on belief revisions, which was mainly focused on how people use answers to questions concerning 
the presence of features in individuals from a given population, Slowiaczek et al. (1992) provided 
some evidence of a feature-positive effect, but not consistently across studies. The only empirical 
investigation that we managed to find which directly and specifically tested the feature-positive 
effect in hypothesis evaluation is Christensen-Szalansky and Bushyhead’s 1981 study on medical 
diagnosis in a real clinical setting: “This study also examined the physicians’ ability to estimate the 
predictive value of an “absent symptom”, since the absence of a symptom also can be helpful in 
assigning a diagnosis. Past psychological research has suggested that people do not efficiently 
process the “absence of cues” (Bourne & Guy, 1968; Hovland & Weiss, 1953; Nahinsky & 
Slaymaker, 1970).” (Christensen-Szalansky & Bushyhead, 1981, p. 931; the studies that the authors 
mentioned concern feature-positive effects in rule and concept learning, but not in hypothesis 
evaluation). Actually, Christensen-Szalansky and Bushyhead failed to find a significant 
underestimation of the diagnostic strength of absent symptoms, but were very cautious about their 
negative finding: “the realism of the study reduced the experimenters’ control of the presence of 
correlated symptoms. For example, if the absence of symptom X always occurred with the presence 
of important symptom Y, perhaps physicians’ apparent “use” of the absent symptom was simply an 
artefact due to this correlation. A more controlled experiment is needed to support these results” (p. 
934). We did not find any more controlled experiments on this topic in later research. 
Basic formal concepts about hypothesis testing 
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From a logical perspective, inductive hypothesis testing and belief update are mostly viewed 
(but see Cohen, 1977) as a change in the epistemic probability p that a hypothesis H is true (as 
opposed to false, corresponding to the probability that its complement, ¬H, is true) after acquiring a 
piece of evidence E, with respect to the probability that H was true before E was acquired. A 
widespread formal method of belief update is Bayes’ rule. A simple formulation of Bayes’ rule, in 
terms of odds and likelihood ratios (Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 
1983), is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HEpHEpHpHpEHpEHp ¬×¬=¬ ||||
  
The | symbol stands for a conditional probability (it can be read “given”). Reading from the 
left, the three terms of the formula are: 
(a) the posterior odds: The ratio of the probability that H is true given E to the probability that H 
is false given E; 
(b) the prior odds: The ratio of the probability that H was true before acquiring E to the 
probability that it was false; 
(c) the Bayes factor–that is, the likelihood ratio of E (hereafter, LR): The ratio of the probability 
of observing E, assuming the truth of H, to the probability of nevertheless observing E if H 
were false. 
The LR is a measure of the strength of confirmation (or falsification) conveyed by E. It 
conveys an immediate and direct description of the impact of evidence on the revision of the initial 
belief. If it is 1, E does not change the probability of H, and thus it is uninformative. If LR > 1, E 
confirms H, by increasing its probability. If LR < 1, E falsifies H, by decreasing its probability (or, 
correspondingly, it confirms ¬H by the magnitude of 1/LR). Given the prior probability of H and its 
posterior probability following the receipt of E (computed by Bayes’ rule), it is possible to formally 
estimate the information value of E in terms of Shannon’s (1948) entropy–that is, in bits. The 
entropy of a discrete random variable X with possible values {x1, ..., xn} , each one being assigned 
the probability p(xi), is expressed as follows: 
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[whenever the n possible values are equally probable, this equation reduces to log2(n)]. The 
information gain associated with a body of evidence E, namely ΔIE is the difference between initial 
entropy and entropy after E has been taken into account: 
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The ΔIE is a convenient quantitative measure for estimating the amount of information 
conveyed by a set of clues. However, several alternative (Bayesian) models of the utility value of 
clues have been proposed (e.g., Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007; Nelson, 2005, 2008). In 
particular, recent experimental work by Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, and Sejnowski (2010) has 
shown that probability gain predicted human information search better than other measures of the 
value of information (but see Nelson 2005 for data showing that information gain and Kullback-
Leibler distance were slightly better predictors than probability gain and impact). According to 
probability gain the information value of the presence of a feature (e.g., the “yes” answer to a 
dichotomous question) is computed as: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]HpHpDHpDHp ¬−¬ ,max|,|max  
that is, probability gain is the difference between the probability of the hypothesis favored 
by the evidence and the probability of the hypothesis that is most likely a priori. 
In tasks in which the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equiprobable, probability gain 
and impact lead to the same values of information of a datum while information gain makes the 
same predictions of the Kullback-Leibler distance (e.g., Nelson 2005, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010).  
From a formal standpoint, it does not matter whether information is conveyed by the 
presence of an attribute in a situation or by its absence. A highly likely occurrence shifts the belief 
towards a hypothesis exactly as the non-occurrence of a highly unlikely event, and vice versa. 
Accordingly, testing whether the occurrence of features affects belief revisions more so than their 
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absence is equivalent to testing whether people, with regard to their spontaneous belief revisions, 
are biased by a formally irrelevant aspect of the situation.  
Overview 
In three paper-and-pencil experiments, we investigated whether and to what extent people 
overestimate the importance of present features in contrast to absent ones when evaluating which of 
two alternative hypotheses provides a better account for a set of observations. The three 
experiments shared the same design, materials and procedure, except for the manipulation of 
whether the probability distributions of occurrences (Study 1), non-occurrences (Study 3) or both 
(Study 2) were presented to participants. In all the studies we also explored whether the ratio of 
present-to-absent features in each set of observations can affect the tendency to overestimate the 
importance of present features. Finally, we explored correlationally whether the informational 
strength of the set of present or absent features, computed as information gain and probability gain, 
can affect that tendency. Since participants came from the same pool and the three experiments 
were identical except for the presentation format of the probabilistic information, we will describe 
the methods and the results as if they were a single experiment. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 126 participants took part in the three studies. Forty-two graduate and 
undergraduate students of the University of Milano-Bicocca volunteered to participate in each study 
(first study: 18 females, 24 males; mean age = 22.7 years, range: 20-29 years; mean education = 16, 
SD = 1.7; second study: 23 females, 19 males; mean age = 22.6 years, range: 19-32 years; mean 
education = 15.8, SD = 1.5; third study: 21 females, 21 males, mean age = 22.2 years, range: 20-27 
years; mean education = 15.7, SD = 1.7). No participants took part in more than one of the studies. 
Materials and procedure 
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Participants received a questionnaire comprising a cover page on which some personal data 
(e.g., age, gender, and years of education) were collected, written instructions and 18 judgmental 
problems.  
The instructions told participants that each judgmental task concerned two card decks―deck 
1 and deck 2 (denoting two competing hypotheses). Each deck was composed of 100 cards. Each 
card within each deck had between zero and five letters printed on its face (between zero and four 
letters for the six problems in which the ratio of present and absent features was 2:2, see the Design 
section below). The letters were chosen from a set composed of: B, C, D, F, G (G was omitted in 
the problems in which the maximum number of letters was four). The instructions stated that the 
number of cards showing a letter was unrelated to the number of cards showing any other letter. In 
other words, the probability of occurrence/non-occurrence of a letter was class-conditionally 
independent of the probabilities of occurrence/non-occurrence of the other letters (i.e., class-
conditional independence of the features). In each of the 18 problems participants were presented 
with a different table illustrating the number of cards (out of the 100 within each deck) on which 
each letter was printed. Presentation format of the numbers in the tables changed across the three 
studies. Specifically, participants were provided with the probabilities of the occurrence (Study 1), 
the occurrence and non-occurrence (Study 2), or the non-occurrence (Study 3) of each letter in each 
deck. In other words, the table entries reported the frequencies corresponding to the likelihoods of 
the features (i.e., the letters) under the two hypotheses, that is: p (E | H) and p (E | ¬H) in Study 1; p 
(E | H), p (E | ¬H), p (¬E | H) and p (¬E | ¬H) in Study 2; p (¬E | H) and p (¬E | ¬H) in Study 3. The 
likelihoods shown in Table 1 are the probabilities corresponding to the frequencies that participants 
received in Study 1, while in Study 2 their complements were shown in addition to them, and in 
Study 3 only their complements were presented. 
The instructions told participants to imagine that the experimenter drew a card from a 
randomly selected deck without disclosing from which deck it was drawn. The random selection 
was meant to convey to participants the information that the prior probability of each hypothesis 
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(i.e., each deck) was p = .5. Although they were not told from which deck the card was drawn, 
participants learnt the content of the drawn card which was described (by stating which letters, 
either two or three, were printed on it and which letters were absent from it) and pictorially shown 
to them. In each problem only one card was drawn and its content changed across the 18 problems 
together with the frequencies of each letter within each deck (the likelihoods corresponding to the 
frequencies that participants received in the 18 problems are shown in Table 1).  
Participants were asked to determine from which deck the card was most likely drawn by 
checking one of three boxes labeled “deck 1”, “deck 2”, or “equiprobable” for each problem. Upon 
completion of each problem, participants were asked to express their confidence in the correctness 
of their answers on a 7-point scale (1 = not confident, 7 = very confident). The order of presentation 
for the three alternative conclusions in each problem (i.e., “equiprobable”, “deck 1” or “deck 2”) 
was fully balanced across participants so that six versions of the questionnaire were created in each 
of the three studies. Participants were individually approached in libraries and study rooms at the 
University of Milano-Bicocca. They were asked to participate in a study on the hypothesis-testing 
process, and those who accepted were given the experimental booklet. In order to familiarize 
participants with the task, the second and the third pages of the booklet provided the instructions 
and a sample problem with detailed explanations about the task and its requirements (the original 
Italian instructions, together with an English translation, are reported in the Appendix).  
Design 
The quantitative parameters and formal properties denoting each one of the problems that 
we used are provided in Tables 1-2. In all problems, the two subsets of present and absent features 
(i.e., letters) pointed in opposite directions: Namely, if the present features taken alone supported 
the choice of deck 1, then the absent features supported the selection of deck 2, and vice versa (see 
Table 2). The 18 problems were devised according to a 3 × 3 fully within-subjects design (with two 
different problem versions in each cell), factoring the type of the correct response and the ratio of 
present-to-absent features. The correct response–namely the hypothesis most probable if taking into 
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account all of the features, including present and absent ones, according to Bayes’ theorem–could 
match either the hypothesis suggested by the present features alone (labeled “presence-consistent” 
problems), the hypothesis suggested by the absent features alone (“absence-consistent” problems) 
or none of the above (“equiprobable” problems, in which the pattern of features was equally likely 
under the two alternative hypotheses). We manipulated the ratio of present-to-absent features 
orthogonally to the previous factor, because it might affect either the occurrence or the strength of 
feature-positive effects. Indeed, if it is true that feature-positive effects descend from the fact that, in 
general, occurrences are less likely than non-occurrences (e.g., Newman et al., 1980), then scenarios 
in which the number of absent features are less than the number of present features could direct 
attention to the former and improve the chances that they are attended. Therefore, in six of the 
problems, present and absent letters came in the same number (ratio of present-to-absent = 2:2); in 
six other problems, there were more present than absent letters (3:2), and in the remaining six 
problems, there were less present than absent letters (2:3) (this manipulation also varied the overall 
amount of letters, four in some problems and five in others). 
Embedded within the main factorial design described above, we also varied non-
orthogonally the informational strength (calculated as either ΔI or probability gain, Table 2 shows 
the utility values) of the sets of letters in order to allow correlational analyses between the 
informational strength and participants’ choices. In the 12 non-equiprobable problems, the 4 or 5 
letters overall conveyed between .12 and .32 bits of information (in terms of probability gain the 
range was between .2 and .32), corresponding to an increase in the probability of the correct 
hypothesis from the initial p (H) = .5 to a minimum posterior probability of p (H | E) = .7 and a 
maximum of p (H | E) = .82 (see Table 1). We chose these values of bits of information because in 
three previous experiments (reported in Cherubini, Russo, Rusconi, D’Addario, & Boccuti, 2009) 
the average threshold of information sensitivity that was measured in 130 non-expert participants 
engaged in abstract tasks similar to the present ones was between .12 and .18 bits. Accordingly, we 
ensured that our clues were informative enough to be perceived by participants. In the 6 
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equiprobable problems, of course, the whole set of letters overall conveyed 0 bits of information 
and the probability gain of all clues was null (see Table 2). 
In non-equiprobable problems, the present clue subset conveyed (if its informativeness was 
measured while ignoring the other set) from .93 to .98 bits (probability gain: from .49 to .5), while 
the absent clue subset transmitted from .92 to .98 bits of information (probability gain: from .49 to 
.5). Hence, the two subsets of clues were highly informative. Equiprobable problems were used for 
presenting weaker subsets of features so that the ΔI of the subsets of features was varied on five 
levels (from very low, that is .01 bits, to high, that is .45 bits) for both present features and absent 
features (see Table 2; the probability gain relative to the present clue subset varied on five levels, 
from a minimum of .07 to a maximum of .37, while the probability gain relative to the absent clue 
subset varied on six levels, range: .06-.37).  
Balancing of present/absent clue informativeness 
We compared the amount of information, operationalized in terms of information gain and 
probability gain, conveyed by the present vs. absent clues in order to ensure that an asymmetry 
favoring the present over the absent clues could not be attributed to an asymmetry in the 
information value of these two kinds of clues. The bits of information conveyed by the present clue 
subset in each problem (M = .68, SD = .41) were not significantly different from those transmitted 
by the absent clue subset (M = .68, SD = .41), t(17) = -.01, two-tailed p = .989. Also when 
computing the utility values in terms of probability gain there was not a significant difference 
between the present clue subset (M = .38, SD = .17) and the absent clue subset (M = .38, SD = .17), 
t(17) = .05, two-tailed p = .964.  
We also considered the informativeness of each clue as a possible source of asymmetry. In 
particular, participants’ judgments might be directed by the high diagnosticity of a single clue. We 
thus computed the informativeness of each clue considering it as if it were present, according to 
both information gain and probability gain. In terms of information gain there was a slight 
asymmetry favoring the present clues (M = .42, SD = .31) over the absent clues (M = .34, SD = .21), 
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which nonetheless was not statistically significant, t(41) = 1.48, two-tailed p = .146. Furthermore, 
the mean difference of .08 bits is below the threshold of participants’ information sensitivity found 
in previous similar experiments (Cherubini et al., 2009). In terms of probability gain, the asymmetry 
favoring the present clues (M = .32, SD = .14) over the absent clues (M = .3, SD = .12) was less 
pronounced, t(41) = .62, two-tailed p = .537. Accordingly, we considered the clues sufficiently 
balanced to avoid any overrating of present features due to an asymmetry of features’ informational 
strength.  
Presentation format of the probabilistic information 
Across the three experiments, we planned to control whether the format of the probability 
information affected the occurrence or the magnitude of feature-positive effects. In all previous 
hypothesis-testing studies that used explicit probabilities, values were used to describe the 
probabilities of feature occurrences. The complementary probabilities of non-occurrences, thus, 
were implicit and had to be derived by the participants. We conjectured that the explicit 
presentation of non-occurrence probabilities might reduce the cognitive load required to take them 
into proper account, and, at the same time, draw attention to their diagnostic relevance, thus 
possibly weakening feature-positive effects. In the first study, we only presented the probabilities of 
occurrences (the most typical manipulation used in previous studies). In the second study, we 
presented both the probabilities of occurrences and the complementary probabilities of non-
occurrences. In the third study, we only presented the probabilities of non-occurrences. 
Main dependent variables and main predictions 
In all experiments, responses were primarily classified as presence-consistent, absence-
consistent, or equiprobable. Presence-consistent responses were those mentioning the hypothesis 
that was supported by the present features (regardless of whether they were correct responses or 
not), and similarly absence-consistent responses reflected choices for the hypothesis supported by 
the absent features. According to this classification, a feature-positive effect should manifest itself 
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as an increase of present-consistent responses with respect both to the chance level and to absent-
consistent and equiprobable responses.  
For further analyses, responses were re-classified as correct or incorrect. Correct responses 
were those in which the hypothesis supported by the whole set of features was chosen for non-
equiprobable problems as well as those in which equiprobable responses were made in response to 
equiprobable problems; all the other responses were deemed incorrect. According to the latter 
classification, a feature-positive effect should manifest itself as an increase in correct responses for 
presence-consistent problems as compared to absence-consistent and equiprobable problems. 
Moderation of feature-positive effects by the present-to-absent features ratio or, between 
experiments, by the format of the probabilistic information is possible. Specifically, we expected 
that more attention should be apportioned to absent features in problems in which they are rare (3:2 
problems) and in Experiments 2 and 3, in which the probabilities of non-occurrences are explicitly 
reported. Finally, we asked all participants to rate their confidence in each response on a 1-to-7 
rating scale. According to this variable, a feature-positive effect might be observed by an increase in 
confidence when responses are presence-consistent rather than absence-consistent or equiprobable 
(or, in terms of correct/incorrect responses, by an increase of confidence in correct responses to 
presence-consistent problems as opposed to correct responses for all other problems). 
Results 
Analysis of participants’ choices when the likelihoods of occurrences were presented 
Table 3 reports the percentages and the standard errors of the means of presence-consistent, 
absence-consistent and equiprobable responses for each one of the nine experimental cells derived 
by the type of response × ratio of present-to-absent features experimental design relative to Study 1, 
in which only the probabilities of features’ occurrence were made explicit to the participants. In all 
conditions but one, presence-consistent responses were significantly more frequent than chance. 
The exception was the condition in which the two decks were equiprobable and the ratio of present-
to-absent features was 3:2. The absence-consistent responses were at chance level in most 
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conditions. They dropped below chance level in the condition in which the correct response was 
presence-consistent and the ratio was either 2:2 or 2:3 as well as the condition in which the two 
decks were equiprobable and the ratio was 2:3. The frequencies of equiprobable responses were 
significantly less than chance in all conditions except for the conditions in which the two decks 
were equiprobable. These findings hint at a strong feature-positive effect. The response suggested 
by the present features was the preferred one in most conditions, both when it was the correct 
response (upper rows in Table 3) and when it was incorrect (middle and bottom rows in Table 3), 
corroborating the conjecture that present features are the ones most considered when evaluating 
which hypothesis fits best with a set of data. 
Correct responses and presence-consistent responses when the likelihoods of occurrences 
were presented 
Table 3 hints at a possible interaction between the type-of-correct-response factor and the 
present-to-absent-features-ratio factor. In order to explore this interaction, we analyzed the mean 
rates of correct responses (the bold diagonal in Table 3). Because the ANOVA is an improper test 
for count data ranging from zero to two per cell (e.g., Jaeger, 2008), we ran a generalized linear 
model for repeated measures with a Poisson distribution for the response variable by means of the 
SASTM statistical package, factoring the type of correct response (presence-consistent vs. absence-
consistent vs. equiprobable) and the ratio of present-to-absent features (2:2 vs. 3:2 vs.2:3). The first-
level effect of the type of correct response was significant, χ2 = 24.44, df = 2, p < .0001 (Mpresence-
consistent = 1.31, Mabsence-consistent = .65, Mequiprobable = .55), confirming that correct responses were more 
frequent in the presence-consistent than in the absence-consistent, χ2 = 11.59, df = 1, p = .0007 
(Bonferroni correction), or equiprobable, χ2=24.31, df=1, p < .0001, conditions. The first-level 
effect of the ratio of present-to-absent features was not significant, χ2 = 2.47, df = 2, p = .29. 
Beyond suggesting that the ratio of present-to-absent features does not have by itself a main 
influence on the frequency of correct responses, this finding also shows that the different number of 
clues in the three conditions (five clues in the 3:2 and 2:3 conditions vs. four clues in the 2:2 
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conditions) did not have appreciable effects on responses. The two-way interaction was significant, 
χ2 = 11.29, df = 4, p < .05. The interaction probably emerged from the decrease of correct responses 
for presence-consistent problems in the 3:2 present-to-absent ratio condition and from the increase 
of correct responses in the absence-consistent and equiprobable problems in the 3:2 present-to-
absent ratio condition (see Figure 1, left panel, and Table 3, bold diagonal). This finding is 
consistent with the prediction that absent clues are apportioned more attention when they are less 
frequent than present clues. A similar trend, this time indicated by a first-level effect for the ratio of 
present-to-absent features, was observed for the occurrence of presence-consistent responses, 
regardless of their correctness (column 1 of Table 3).  
We statistically explored this interaction by means of another generalized Poisson model, 
featuring the number of presence-consistent responses as the dependent variable and factoring the 
type of problem and the ratio of present-to-absent features. The analysis yielded a significant first-
level effect for the ratio of present-to-absent features, χ2 = 8.65, df = 2, p = .0132 (M2:2 problems = 
1.18; M3:2 problems = .97; M2:3 problems = 1.21). This finding corroborates the idea that present features 
drive attention less when the absent features are rare than when they are equally frequent or more 
frequent than present features. The first-level effect of the type-of-problems factor was also 
significant, χ2 = 14.18, df = 2, p < .001 (Mpresence-consistent problems = 1.31, Mabsence-consistent problems = 1.12, 
Mequiprobable problems = .93), suggesting that, although participants in aggregate form had an overall 
preference for presence-consistent responses, they were also sensitive to the formal correctness of 
the response (presence-consistent vs. equiprobable: χ2 = 12.43, df = 1, p = .0004; presence-
consistent vs. absence-consistent: χ2 = 5.58, df = 1, p = .0181; absent-consistent versus equiprobable 
was not significant, χ2 = 3.15, df = 1, p = .0757). The two-way interaction was not significant 
(Figure 1, right panel). 
Analysis of participants’ choices when likelihoods of both occurrences and non-occurrences 
were presented 
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Table 4 reports the percentages and the standard errors of the means of presence-consistent, 
absence-consistent and equiprobable responses in each experimental condition when participants 
were provided with both the probability distributions of occurrences and the likelihoods of non-
occurrences (i.e., Study 2). In all conditions but one, presence-consistent responses were 
significantly more frequent than chance. The exception was the same as in Study 1–that is, the 
condition in which the two decks were equiprobable and the ratio of present-to-absent features was 
3:2. Equiprobable responses were at chance level or significantly below it in all conditions. The 
absence-consistent responses were below chance level in most conditions, except for equiprobable 
3:2 problems (in which they were above the chance level of 33%; this was the only condition in 
which they were preferred to presence-consistent responses) and either absence-consistent or 
equiprobable 2:3 problems (in which they were at chance level). These preliminary tests apparently 
replicated the strong feature-positive effect observed in the previous study: The response suggested 
by the present features was the preferred one in most conditions, both when it was the correct 
response (upper rows in Table 4) and when it was incorrect (middle and bottom rows in Table 4), 
with only one exception. 
Correct responses and presence-consistent responses when the likelihoods of both occurrences 
and non-occurrences were presented 
The frequency of correct responses was analyzed by means of a generalized repeated-
measures model for a Poisson distribution, factoring the type of correct response (presence-
consistent vs. absence-consistent vs. equiprobable) and the ratio of present-to-absent features (2:2 
vs. 3:2 vs. 2:3). The first-level effect for the type of correct response was significant, χ2 = 19.98, df 
= 2, p < .0001 (Mpresence-consistent = 1.36, Mabsence-consistent = .48, Mequiprobable = .53), confirming that 
correct responses were more frequent in presence-consistent than in the absence-consistent, χ2 = 
19.17, df = 1, p < .0001 (Bonferroni correction) or equiprobable, χ2 = 24.99, df = 1, p < .0001, 
conditions. The first-level effect of the ratio of present-to-absent features was not significant, χ2 = 
4.42, df = 2. The two-way interaction was significant, χ2 = 10.9, df = 4, p < .05. The statistical 
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results closely match those of Study 1. However, in Study 1, the interaction was driven by a relative 
increase in correct responses for absence-consistent and equiprobable problems with a 3:2 ratio of 
present-to-absent features along with a decrease in accuracy in the 3:2 presence-consistent 
problems. By contrast, in this study, the interaction was probably due to the higher frequency of 
correct responses in the equiprobable problems compared to the absence-consistent problems for the 
2:2 and 3:2 conditions, which reversed into a greater accuracy in the absence-consistent problems 
than in the equiprobable problems for the 2:3 condition (see Figure 2, left panel, and Table 4, bold 
diagonal).  
Similar to Study 1, a generalized Poisson model featuring the number of presence-consistent 
responses as the dependent variable and factoring the type of problem and the ratio of present-to-
absent features yielded significant first-level effects for the type of problem, χ2 = 19.98, df = 2, p < 
.0001 (Mpresence-consistent problems = 1.36, Mabsence-consistent problems = 1.18, Mequiprobable problems = 0.80) and the 
ratio of present-to-absent features, χ2 = 8.17, df = 2, p < .05 (M2:2 problems = 1.09, M3:2 problems = 1.04, 
M2:3 problems = 1.21). The former effect replicates the one found in Study 1, showing that, beyond 
generally preferring the presence-consistent responses, participants were also partly sensitive to the 
correct responses. The latter effect shows a tendency for the preference towards present-consistent 
responses to decrease for the problem versions in which there were two absent clues (i.e., the 2:2 
and 3:2 problems) as compared to those in which they were three (the 2:3 problem versions), and it 
was qualified by the significant two-way interaction, χ2 = 14.28, df = 4, p < .01 (see the first column 
of Table 2 and Figure 2, right panel). The interaction probably emerged from the decrease in 
presence-consistent responses in the 3:2 condition of the equiprobable problems in comparison to 
the 2:2 and 2:3 conditions as well as from the increase in presence-consistent responses in the 2:3 
condition of the equiprobable problems in comparison to the 2:2 and 3:2 conditions It might derive 
from a rarity effect, in turn favoring either absent features (in terms of a drop of presence-consistent 
responses in the equiprobable 3:2 problems) or present features (in terms of an increase in the 
presence-consistent responses in the equiprobable 2:3 problems). 
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Analysis of participants’ choices when the likelihoods of non-occurrences were presented 
Table 5 reports percentages and the standard errors of the means of presence-consistent, 
absence-consistent and equiprobable responses in each experimental condition in Study 3, in which 
we exclusively presented to participants the probabilities of non-occurrences. In all of the presence-
consistent and absence-consistent problems, presence-consistent responses were significantly more 
frequent than chance. An exception was with equiprobable problems, with presence-consistent 
responses at chance level in all conditions, whereas, in Studies 1 and 2, they were at chance level 
only in the 3:2 versions of the equiprobable problems. Absence-consistent responses, which were 
mostly below chance levels in the previous studies, were mostly at chance level in the present study, 
possibly indicating a marginal increase in the attendance to absent features. Equiprobable responses 
were mostly below chance level, except for the equiprobable problems, in which they were at 
chance level. Divergences from Studies 1 and 2 are small: The overall pattern still suggests a rather 
strong, quite generalized preference for attending to present features over absent ones. 
Correct responses and presence-consistent responses when the likelihoods of non-occurrences 
were presented 
We analyzed the rate of correct answers by means of a generalized repeated-measures model 
for a Poisson distribution, factoring the type of correct response (presence-consistent, absence-
consistent, equiprobable) and the ratio of present-to-absent features (2:2, 3:2, 2:3). The first-level 
effect for the type of correct response was once again significant, χ2 = 11.14, df = 2, p < .005 
(Mpresence-consistent = 1.2, Mabsence-consistent = .51, Mequiprobable = .67), confirming that correct responses 
were more frequent in the presence-consistent than in the absence-consistent, χ2 = 10.59, df = 1, p = 
.0011 (Bonferroni correction), or equiprobable, χ2 = 9.15, df = 1, p = .0025, problems. As occurred 
in the previous studies, the first-level effect for the ratio of present-to-absent features was not 
significant, χ2 = .80, df = 2. However, in contrast to the previous studies, the two-way interaction 
was also not significant (see Figure 3, left panel): Hence, the ratio of present-to-absent features in 
this version of the task had no appreciable effects whatsoever on the frequency of correct responses. 
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A second generalized Poisson model featured the number of presence-consistent responses 
as the dependent variable and factored the type of problem and the ratio of present-to-absent 
features. Similar to the two previous studies, it yielded a significant first-level effect for the type of 
problem, χ2 = 17.58, df = 2, p < .0005 (Mpresence-consistent problems = 1.2, Mabsence-consistent problems = 1.13, 
Mequiprobable problems = .67). Surprisingly the effect shows that the presence-consistent responses were 
more frequent in the presence-consistent problems in comparison to the equiprobable problems, χ2 = 
16.64, df = 1, p < .0001 (Bonferroni correction) and in the absence-consistent problems in 
comparison to the equiprobable problems, χ2 = 146.96, df = 1, p < .0001. However, presence-
consistent responses were not significantly more frequent in presence-consistent vs. absence-
consistent problems, χ2 = .60, df = 1, p = .4368 (see Figure 3, right panel). If anything, this pattern 
hints at a strengthening, instead of a weakening, of the feature-positive effect in this version of the 
task, as far as the rate of presence-consistent responses are concerned. The first-level effect of the 
ratio of present-to-absent features was not significant, χ2 = .27, df = 2, nor it was the two-way 
interaction, χ2 = 6.41, df = 4, confirming that the rarity of features in this study did not appreciably 
affect the overall preference for the responses suggested by present features. 
Confidence ratings 
We then analyzed the mean confidence ratings toward the correct responses (derived from a 
1-to-7 rating scale, in which 7 indicates extreme confidence and 1 reflects no confidence) in the 
three experiments. Participants expressed their confidence only relative to the responses they chose, 
thus the dataset included a relatively large number of missing values requiring a powerful statistical 
analysis. Accordingly, we analyzed the data by means of a linear mixed-effects model which 
provides greater statistical robustness than ANOVA (e.g., Blom & Baayen, in press). In the 
analysis, the experiment and the correct-response type were introduced as potentially significant 
fixed effects. Participant, questionnaire version, and the different judgmental problem were 
modeled as random-effect factors. Fixed-effect factors were modeled by contrasting each level of a 
factor to a specified reference level. The levels of experiment (the reference level is shown in 
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boldface) were: Study 1, Study 2, Study 3. The levels of correct-response type were: presence-
consistent, absence-consistent, equiprobable. We started with a full factorial model, which was 
progressively simplified by removing the predictors that did not significantly contribute to the 
goodness of fit of the model. We tested both first-level effects and the interaction between the 
fixed-effect factors. The statistical significance of the fixed effects was determined using a Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling algorithm with 10,000 samples. 
The final model included the correct-response type as significant fixed-effect factor and 
participant, questionnaire version, and judgmental task as significant random-effect factors. In 
particular, the presence-consistent level of correct-response type was not significant (MCMC mean 
= .26, pMCMC = .104), indicating that confidence toward the correct presence-consistent response 
was not significantly different from confidence toward the correct absence-consistent response. By 
contrast, the equiprobable level of correct-response type was significant (MCMCmean = -.56, 
pMCMC = .002), indicating that confidence in the correct equiprobable responses was significantly 
lower than confidence in the correct absence-consistent responses. We also took the presence-
consistent correct response as the reference level in order to compare presence-consistent vs. 
equiprobable correct-response types. It emerged that the equiprobable level of correct-response type 
was significant (MCMC mean = -.82, pMCMC = .0001), indicating that confidence in the correct 
equiprobable responses was significantly lower than confidence in the correct presence-consistent 
responses. Neither the first-level effect of the experiment nor the experiment × correct-response 
type interaction emerged as significant predictors of confidence toward the correct responses (see 
Figure 4, left panel). 
We ran a second linear mixed-effects model on the confidence ratings expressed in the 
presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses provided by participants. 
Experiment and response type were modeled as fixed-effect factors, and participant, questionnaire 
version, and the judgmental task were modeled as random-effect factors. Fixed-effects factors were 
modeled by contrasting each level of a factor to a specified reference level. The levels of 
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experiment (the reference level is shown in boldface) were: Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3. The 
levels of response type were: presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable. We tested 
both first-level effects and the interaction between the fixed-effect factors. We used the same 
procedure as in the previous analysis, in which an initial full factorial model was progressively 
simplified by removing predictors that did not significantly improve the goodness of fit of the 
model. The statistical significance of the fixed effects was determined using a Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) sampling algorithm with 10,000 samples. 
The final model included response type as significant fixed-effect factor, and participant, 
questionnaire version and the judgmental task as significant random-effect factors. In particular, the 
equiprobable response-type level was significant (MCMC mean = -.35, pMCMC = .0001), 
indicating that participants’ confidence in the equiprobable responses they gave significantly 
decreased with respect to confidence in the absence-consistent responses. Also the presence-
consistent response-type level was significant (MCMC mean = .15, pMCMC = .005), indicating 
that participants were significantly more confident in the presence-consistent responses than in the 
absence-consistent responses. In order to contrast the presence-consistent level to the equiprobable 
level we also took the presence-consistent response type as the reference level. The equiprobable 
response-type level was significant (MCMC mean = -.5, pMCMC = .0001), indicating that 
confidence in equiprobable responses was significantly lower than confidence in presence-
consistent responses. Neither the first-level effect of experiment nor the experiment × response type 
interaction were significant predictors of confidence ratings (see Figure 4, right panel).  
Correlations between the normative utility values and presence-/absence-consistent responses 
By aggregating data across participants for the 18 problems, we performed tests of 
correlation between the number of presence-consistent and absence-consistent choices in each 
problem and either the ΔI in bits or the utility values defined by the probability gain conveyed in 
that problem by the two subsets of present or absent clues (see Table 2 for the exact values). In 
Study 1, both the ΔI and the probability gain of present clues were strongly correlated with the 
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number of presence-consistent choices, r ΔI = .61, N = 18, two-tailed p = .008, r P.G. = .62, N = 18, 
two-tailed p = .006. In Study 2, we found an even stronger association of the normative utility 
values of the present clue subset with the number of presence-consistent responses, r ΔI = .82, N = 
18, two-tailed p < .001, r P.G. = .84, N = 18, two-tailed p < .001. The results of Study 3 confirmed 
this tendency, r ΔI = .91, N = 18, two-tailed p < .001, r P.G. = .88, N = 18, two-tailed p < .001. These 
findings indicate that, in aggregated form, participants were sensitive to the amount of information 
conveyed by the present clues. In other words, the more the present clues were informative, the 
more likely the choice of the presence-consistent response was, irrespective of the information 
format of the probabilistic information they received. 
Conversely, a different pattern emerged when considering the association between absence-
consistent responses and the utility of the absent clue subset. In Study 1, there was not a significant 
correlation between absence-consistent choices and either the ΔI of absent clues, r = .06, N = 18, 
two-tailed p = .814, or the probability gain, r = .01, N = 18, two-tailed p = .978. In Study 2, there 
was a significant negative correlation between absence-consistent responses and either the ΔI of 
absent clues, r = -.6, N = 18, two-tailed p = .009, or the probability gain, r = -.6, N = 18, two-tailed 
p = .008. Study 3 confirmed this significant negative association, r ΔI = -.56, N = 18, two-tailed p = 
.016, r P.G. = -.62, N = 18, two-tailed p = .006. Hence, these results indicate that either the amount of 
information conveyed by absent clues did not appreciably affect the decision to choose or not 
choose the absence-consistent response (Study 1), or the more the absent clues were informative, 
the less likely the choice of the absence-consistent response was (in Studies 2 and 3, in which the 
probability distributions of non-occurrences were available).  
Cross-experimental analyses and discussion 
The three studies were run sequentially, and participants were not assigned randomly to the 
three samples. Apart from that, the studies were homogeneous: The participants came from the 
same pool; the procedure and stimuli were the same, except for the presentation format of the 
probabilistic information; and the sample sizes were the same. Hence, a statistical cross-
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examination of the three studies could theoretically be reliable. The mean number and percentage of 
choices (ranging from 0 to 2) for each response in each problem across the 126 participants (252 
responses) to the three studies are reported in Table 6.  
Presence-consistent responses were more frequent than chance in all conditions for both 
correct and incorrect responses, with the exception of the equiprobable problems with a 3:2 ratio of 
present-to-absent features, in which they were at chance level. All other responses (again, both 
correct and incorrect ones) were at chance level or below it. The pattern hints at a strong feature-
positive effect, which is only slightly moderated by the correctness of responses and by the ratio of 
present-to-absent features. 
Analysis of correct responses across the three studies 
We analyzed the relative frequency of correct responses (Table 6, bold diagonal) by means 
of a generalized mixed model for a Poisson distribution, factoring the type of problems and the ratio 
of present-to-absent features within-participants and the format of probabilistic information as a 
between-groups variable. The first-level effect for the type of problems was significant, χ2 = 55.87, 
df = 2, p < .0001 (Mpresence-consistent problems = 1.29, Mabsence-consistent problems = .55, Mequiprobable problems = 
.59). This finding indicates that, independent of all other factors, namely the ratio of present-to-
absent features and the presentation format of probabilistic information, correct responses were 
more frequent when they were backed by present features than when they were congruent with 
absent features, χ2 = 40.70, df = 1, p < .0001 (Bonferroni correction), or were inconsistent with both 
present and absent features (i.e., equiprobable problems), χ2 = 54.79, df = 1, p < .0001 (see Figure 5, 
left panel). Notice that, because of the structure of the problems, this means that correct responses 
were more frequent when they were opposite to the responses congruent with the absent features. 
The first-level effects for the ratio of present-to-absent features, χ2 = 5.05, df = 2, p = .08, and for 
the presentation format of the probabilistic information were not significant, χ2 = 2.13, df = 2, p = 
.34. All of the two-ways interactions did not reach significance. The three-way interaction was 
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significant, χ2 = 21.22, df = 8, p < .01, probably originating from the different trends of the type of 
problems × ratio of present-to-absent features two-way interactions across the three experiments. 
Analysis of presence-consistent responses across the three studies 
A second generalized mixed model for a Poisson distribution with the same factors as the 
previous one was run to analyze the frequency of presence-consistent responses (Table 6, first 
column). It yielded a significant first-level effect for the type of problem, χ2 = 49.46, df = 2, p < 
.0001 (Mpresence-consistent problems = 1.29, Mabsence-consistent problems = 1.14, Mequiprobable problems = .80). 
Presence-consistent responses were significantly more frequent in presence-consistent than 
absence-consistent, χ2 = 8.46, df = 1, p = .0036 (Bonferroni correction) and equiprobable problems, 
χ2 = 40.53, df = 1, p < .0001. However, presence-consistent responses were also significantly more 
frequent in absence-consistent than in equiprobable problems, χ2 = 27.61 , df = 1, p < .0001. 
Although the increased frequency of presence-consistent responses in presence-consistent problems, 
in which they were correct, in comparison to absence-consistent problems, in which they were 
incorrect, shows a residual sensitivity to the formal correctness of responses, their increased amount 
in comparison to equiprobable problems (that is apparent also for presence-consistent responses in 
absence-consistent problems) probably reflects the fact that, in the latter problems, the amount of 
information conveyed by present or absent clues was very small. Thus, the finding supports the idea 
that participants are mostly sensitive to the amount of information conveyed by present clues, as 
shown by correlations with the ΔI and the probability gain of the present clue subsets in each 
problem (see below). The first-level effect for the ratio of present-to-absent features was also 
significant, χ2 = 12.62, df = 2, p < .005 (M2:2 problems = 1.10, M 3:2 problems = 1.00, M2:3 problems = 1.13). 
However, this effect is best accounted for by the significant type of problem × ratio of present-to-
absent features two-way interaction, χ2 = 22.96, df = 4, p < .0001, which shows that presence-
consistent responses were indeed less frequent in the 3:2 problems, but only in the equiprobable 
problems (see Figure 5, right panel, and Table 6, first column). Thus, the rarity of absent clues can 
draw attention to absent features, albeit exclusively in circumstances in which the amount of 
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information conveyed by the two subsets of present or absent clues is tiny. No other first-level 
effects or interactions reached significance. 
Confidence ratings and sensitivity to the clue informativeness across the three studies 
The mean confidence across the 18 problems in the three studies was positively correlated 
with the number of presence-consistent responses,  r = .67, N = 18, two-tailed p = .002, whereas it 
was negatively correlated with the number of equiprobable responses, r = -.76, N = 18, two-tailed p 
< .001. Conversely, the mean confidence did not correlate significantly with either the number of 
correct responses, r = .37, N = 18, two-tailed p = .135, or with the number of absence-consistent 
responses, r = -.26, N = 18, two-tailed p = .296. That is, the more participants chose presence-
consistent responses, the more they trusted their choices, whereas the more they chose equiprobable 
responses, the less they trusted their choices. By contrast, confidence did not appreciate as a 
function of either the actual number of formally correct choices or the number of absence-consistent 
choices. 
By aggregating data across participants for the 18 problems, we performed tests of 
correlation between the number of presence-consistent and absence-consistent choices in each 
problem and either the ΔI in bits or the probability gain conveyed in that problem by the two 
subsets of present or absent clues. Both the ΔI and the probability gain of present clues were 
positively correlated with the number of presence-consistent choices, r ΔI = .85, N = 18, two-tailed p 
< .001, r P.G. = .86, N = 18, two-tailed p < .001. Conversely, both the ΔI and the probability gain of 
absent clues were negatively correlated with the number of absence-consistent choices, r ΔI = -.51, 
N = 18, two-tailed p = .031, r P.G. = -.56, N = 18, two-tailed p = .015. 
General Discussion 
This study lends conclusive support to one main finding and less strong support to some 
ancillary findings, which merit further investigation. 
Main finding: The feature-positive effect on the evaluation of alternative hypotheses 
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Results of the current study show that people overrate the information conveyed by the 
presence of clues in comparison to that conveyed by the absence of other clues when they evaluate 
available data for establishing which of two competing hypotheses is the most likely. Previous 
studies have reported this tendency (e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Slowiaczek et al., 
1992), but no conclusive empirical evidence could directly support it. To our knowledge, the only 
study that directly investigated this issue with quasi-experimental methods failed to find support for 
it (Christensen-Szalansky & Bushyhead, 1981), although the authors attributed their negative 
finding to possible artifacts. The Christensen-Szalansky and Bushyhead (1981)’s study used Bayes’ 
theorem as criterion for evaluating physicians’ calibration, but its nature was correlational (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1971). Accordingly, in the present experiments we used orthogonal designs instead of 
intercorrelated cues that are representative of the real world. 
In the present studies, there are at least four sources of converging evidence for the 
occurrence of a relatively strong feature-positive effect in the evaluation of alternative hypotheses: 
1) In all experiments, the hypothesis consistent with the information conveyed by present 
clues and therefore inconsistent with the information conveyed by absent clues was 
preferred significantly above chance level in most conditions, regardless of whether it 
was the formally correct response or not. There were only a few exceptions, with 
presence-consistent responses at chance level, that emerged in some instances in which 
the two hypotheses were formally equiprobable. However, in those problems, the subset 
of present clues was formally very weak (that is, it conveyed a very low ΔI/probability 
gain). Because participants were sensitive mostly to the information conveyed by present 
clues (see point 4, below), it is not surprising that, in those problems, their preference for 
the positive-consistent responses was weakened. 
2) In all of the studies, the formally correct responses were chosen significantly more often 
when they were consistent with the responses indicated by the present clues than when 
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they were consistent with absent clues or were inconsistent with both present and absent 
clues (i.e., equiprobable problems). 
3) Overall, across the three experiments, the mean confidence in the presence-consistent 
responses was higher than the mean confidence in either absence-consistent or 
equiprobable responses (see Figure 4, right panel). Furthermore, as shown by the cross-
experimental analysis, the mean confidence toward responses to the 18 problems, across 
participants, was positively correlated with the number of presence-consistent choices 
that were selected for those problems. It did not correlate significantly with the number 
of correct or absence-consistent choices and it was negatively correlated with the 
number of equiprobable responses. 
4) In all studies, the amount of information (as measured by ΔI and probability gain) 
conveyed by the subset of present clues in each problem correlated positively with the 
number of presence-consistent choices on that problem, across participants. The amount 
of information conveyed by the subset of absent clues either did not correlate 
significantly (Study 1) or was negatively correlated with the number of absence-
consistent choices (Studies 2-3). These intriguing findings suggest that, although humans 
are probably sensitive to some extent to the informativeness of data (e.g., Cherubini et 
al., 2009; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), this is mostly the case when they evaluate the 
meaning of occurrences. Apparently, people can sometimes perceive the informativeness 
of the absence of some features, in particular when the probability distributions of non-
occurrences are explicit. However, in those instances, on average, they do not revise 
their beliefs consistently with that information. 
These converging pieces of evidence are mostly independent of the presentation format of 
the probabilities of the clues under the two alternative hypotheses, which was manipulated across 
the three studies. They are also mostly independent of the ratio of present-to-absent features 
presented in each problem, which was manipulated within each study. 
 
MISSING THE DOG THAT FAILED TO BARK 30
Ancillary findings: Possible moderators of the feature-positive effect 
The influence of the rarity of the absent clues 
Rarity effects concern the apportionment of increased attention to rare events in contrast to 
common ones (e.g., Feeney, Evans & Clibbens, 2000; Feeney, Evans & Venn, 2008; Green & Over, 
2000; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; 2003; in legal contexts, for 
example, see Loftus, 1976; Wells & Lindsay, 1980). We included in our initial predictions a 
hypothesis that was based on rarity effects, conjecturing that participants would possibly pay more 
heed to absent clues when they were rare in comparison to present ones. The prediction followed 
from Newman et al. (1980)’s evolutionary-based argument that feature-positive effects originate 
from the fact that, in nature, the occurrence of events is less common than the non-occurrence of 
events and thus is, in a very general sense, more informative. Following from that argument, in 
specific contexts in which absent clues occur less than present clues, an opposite trend to pay heed 
to absent clues could arise. Accordingly, we devised different versions of each problem, varying the 
ratio of present-to-absent clues along three levels (2:2; 3:2; 2:3). Results were inconclusive with 
respect to the original prediction. A slight weakening of the feature positive effects occurred in 
Study 1 in the 3:2 problems, as shown by the type of problems × ratio of present-to-absent two-way 
interaction for the frequency of correct responses observed in that study. However, the interaction, 
although it was still significant, followed a distinctively different pattern in Study 2 and was not 
significant in Study 3 (thus giving rise to the three-way interaction observed in the cross-
experimental analyses of correct responses). The cross-experimental analyses of the presence-
consistent responses showed a decrease of presence-consistent choices occurring in the 3:2 
equiprobable problems only, that is, in those problems in which the present clues were least 
informative. This set of different findings suggests that the rarity of absent clues might, in some 
circumstances, draw attention to them, but this effect is not systematic, and it apparently interacts 
with the presentation format of probabilistic information as well as with the amount of information 
conveyed by the stimuli in ways that are in need of further specification. 
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The effect of the presentation format of the probabilistic information 
In most past experiments on hypothesis testing and evaluation that used explicit probabilistic 
information, only the probabilities of the occurrences of different features were communicated to 
participants (e.g., Cherubini et al., 2010; McKenzie, 2006; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Slowiaczek et 
al., 1992). We conjectured that this format might inflate feature-positive effects, because the 
probabilities of non-occurrences have to be inferred by complementation. Accordingly, we 
systematically changed the way probabilities were communicated to the participants across the three 
studies: In Study 1, we communicated the probabilities of occurrences; in Study 2, we 
communicated the probabilities of occurrences and non-occurrences; in Study 3, we communicated 
exclusively the probabilities of non-occurrences. Contrary to the initial conjecture, the probabilistic 
format did not have appreciable effects on choices, as shown by the cross-experimental analyses. It 
had some effect on confidence ratings, although the two linear mixed models we ran showed that 
neither the first-level effect of the type of experiment nor the experiment × response type interaction 
were significant, thus indicating that the pattern was homogeneous across the studies (see Figure 4). 
Apparently, communicating explicitly the probabilities of non-occurrences gave a hint to the 
participants that those probabilities should be considered and thus they perceived their diagnosticity 
but they seemed to disregard this information when choosing the most likely hypothesis as shown 
by the significant negative correlations between the informativeness (calculated as ΔI and 
probability gain) conveyed by the absent clue subset and the number of absence-consistent choices 
in Studies 2 and 3 (but not in Study 1, in which non-occurrences were not explicitly presented to 
participants).  
The only other appreciable effect of the different probabilistic formats is its interaction with 
the rarity of absent features, as discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Conclusion 
The present scrutiny shows that, in the evaluation stage of hypothesis development, the 
occurrence of clues is systematically overrated with respect to the non-occurrence of other clues. 
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The tendency to neglect the significance of the dog that failed to bark, as noted by Arthur Conan 
Doyle and mentioned by Ross (1978) and Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983), far from being 
supported only by anecdotes, can be robustly observed in abstract laboratory tasks with fully 
explicit probabilistic information. The tendency is not appreciably or systematically weakened in 
those contexts in which non-occurrences are rare in comparison to occurrences, neither is it by the 
overt display of the probabilities of non-occurrences. Furthermore, this feature-positive effect 
influences confidence towards judgments: On average, participants trusted judgments based on 
occurrences more than those based on non-occurrences (although this effect was undermined by the 
overt presentation of the probabilities of non-occurrence, see Figure 4). Finally, participants showed 
a remarkable sensitivity to the amount of information conveyed by the occurrence of stimuli (as 
shown by a positive correlation between the ΔI/probability gain of and the number of presence-
consistent choices), but they were either insensitive to the amount of information conveyed by non-
occurrences (Study 1) or their sensitivity did not actually help them to consider absent clues in their 
eventual decisions (Studies 2-3). 
The feature-positive effect in hypothesis evaluation might have important consequences for 
confirmation biases (e.g., Klayman, 1995; McKenzie, 2004, 2006). The most common information-
gathering testing strategy is positive testing, consisting of the search for clues whose occurrence is 
consistent with the hypothesis under examination. That is, when a hypothesis is tested positively, 
occurrences confirm it, whereas non-occurrences confute it. This information-gathering strategy, if 
coupled with the tendency to overrate occurrences in comparison to non-occurrences, would give 
rise to a systematic tendency to improperly confirm the tested hypothesis (e.g., Klayman, 1995; 
McKenzie, 2004, 2006). This type of confirmation bias might have relevant implications in 
circumstances in which people cannot resort to previous knowledge about the relationships among 
cues in the real world (situations that were exemplified in our experiments), for example when 
evaluating technical reports (e.g., statistical write-ups), possibly contributing to inappropriate 
evaluations of the acquired data and ultimately to inefficient decisions. 
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This type of confirmation bias might also have important, detrimental side effects in 
contexts in which the rigorous testing of hypotheses is of critical importance, such as in scientific 
research, forensic practice, medical diagnosis (e.g., Christensen-Szalansky and Bushyhead’s 1981; 
Scandellari, 2005) and health behaviors (e.g., Rassin, Muris, Franken, & van Straten, 2008). It 
might also have relevant consequences in the social domain, where feature-positive effects have 
been proven to occur (e.g., Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982) and other types of confirmatory 
tendencies toward stereotypes are already known (e.g., Fiedler & Walther, 2004). However, because 
the present experiments used abstract problems only, estimating the impact of the feature-positive 
effect on the evaluation of hypotheses in practical domains will require further investigation. In this 
sense, it has yet to be clarified whether and under what circumstances the feature-positive effect 
might diminish or even reverse to a feature-negative effect (FNE, Fiedler, Eckert, & Poysiak, 1989) 
when evaluating competing hypotheses.  
More generally, it has to be noted that although research on judgment and decision making 
has pointed out people’s difficulty to adhere to Bayesian principles in explicit tasks, recent studies 
have offered Bayesian accounts of more implicit processes suggesting sophisticated abilities of 
adult, children, and infants (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; Téglás, Vul, Girotto, Gonzalez, 
Tenenbaum, & Bonatti, 2011; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). Accordingly, future studies 
should elucidate whether and in which kind of hypothesis-testing tasks people might exhibit a 
Bayesian-like weighing of both present and absent features. 
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Table 1 
Formal properties of the 18 problems used in the three experiments (the conditional probabilities of 
the present clues are in boldface). 
 
Likelihoods 
Problem Deck Prior probabilities 
p(B) p(C) p(D) p(F) p(G) 
Posterior probabilities 
1 .5 .43 .8 .89 .93  .8 1 
2 .5 .01 .08 .1 .1  .2 
1 .5 .03 .29 .35 .65 .25 .5 2 
2 .5 .3 .2 .9 .35 .62 .5 
1 .5 .85 .8 .95 .95 .96 .23 3 
2 .5 .04 .44 .3 .1 .1 .77 
1 .5 .35 .2 .14 .4  .5 4 
2 .5 .1 .98 .39 .4  .5 
1 .5 .01 .11 .8 .3 .2 .21 5 
2 .5 .8 .75 .76 .96 .9 .79 
1 .5 .9 .7 .95 .96  .26 6 
2 .5 .02 .22 .1 .1  .74 
1 .5 .9 .7 .9 .9 .9 .27 7 2 .5 .02 .22 .2 .4 .2 .73 
1 .5 .5 .7 .3 .5 .35 .5 8 2 .5 .09 .88 .97 .4 .26 .5 
1 .5 .02 .16 .1 .1  .76 9 2 .5 .5 .7 .94 .96  .24 
1 .5 .8 .2 .15 .45 .85 .5 10 2 .5 .07 .68 .4 .35 .4 .5 
1 .5 .02 .16 .5 .1 .05 .74 11 2 .5 .7 .6 .45 .95 .95 .26 
1 .5 .09 .88 .85 .16  .5 12 2 .5 .1 .5 .2 .75  .5 
1 .5 .02 .16 .2 .12 .1 .79 13 2 .5 .5 .7 .9 .9 .85 .21 
1 .5 .09 .88 .97 .3 .76 .5 14 2 .5 .83 .22 .55 .8 .35 .5 
1 .5 .01 .11 .15 .1 .1 .27 15 2 .5 .85 .6 .8 .8 .9 .73 
1 .5 .85 .65 .65 .89 .94 .74 16 2 .5 .02 .16 .3 .1 .05 .26 
1 .5 .01 .11 .16 .15  .3 17 
2 .5 .75 .5 .9 .95  .7 
1 .5 .8 .5 .6 .7 .96 .82 18 
2 .5 .01 .08 .3 .15 .1 .18 
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Table 2 
The properties of the 18 problems used in the three experiments: Deck favored by the consideration 
of the present-clue subset, absent-clue subset or all clues (i.e., correct), and utility values of the 
present clues, absent clues, and all clues according to four optimal-experimental-design models 
(I.G. = Information Gain; K.-L. = Kullback-Leibler distance; P.G. = Probability Gain). 
 
Probl
em 
Correct 
response 
Response 
suggeste
d by 
present 
clues 
Response 
suggeste
d by 
absent 
clues 
I.G./K.-
L. of all 
clues 
I.G./K.-L 
of 
present 
clues 
I.G./K.-L 
of absent 
clues 
P.G./Imp
act of all 
clues 
P.G./Imp
act of 
present 
clues 
P.G./Imp
act of 
absent 
clues 
1 Deck 1 Deck 1 Deck 2 .28 .98 .92 .3 .5 .49 
2 equiprobable Deck 2 Deck 1 0 .45 .45 0 .37 .37 
3 Deck 2 Deck 1 Deck 2 .22 .93 .98 .27 .49 .5 
4 equiprobable Deck 2 Deck 1 0 .02 .02 0 .08 .09 
5 Deck 2 Deck 2 Deck 1 .26 .98 .94 .29 .5 .49 
6 Deck 2 Deck 1 Deck 2 .17 .94 .98 .24 .49 .5 
7 Deck 2 Deck 1 Deck 2 .16 .94 .97 .23 .49 .5 
8 equiprobable Deck 1 Deck 2 0 .02 .02 0 .08 .08 
9 Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 1 .2 .93 .97 .26 .49 .5 
10 equiprobable Deck 1 Deck 2 0 .22 .22 0 .27 .27 
11 Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 1 .17 .93 .97 .24 .49 .5 
12 equiprobable Deck 1 Deck 2 0 .04 .04 0 .11 .11 
13 Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 1 .26 .93 .98 .29 .49 .5 
14 equiprobable Deck 2 Deck 1 0 .01 .01 0 .07 .06 
15 Deck 2 Deck 2 Deck 1 .16 .98 .95 .23 .5 .49 
16 Deck 1 Deck 1 Deck 2 .17 .97 .94 .24 .5 .49 
17 Deck 2 Deck 2 Deck 1 .12 .97 .94 .2 .5 .49 
18 Deck 1 Deck 1 Deck 2 .32 .98 .93 .32 .5 .49 
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Table 3 
Percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each type of choice in each type of 
problem in Study 1. There were two problems in each experimental cell, and thus the frequency of 
responses ranged from 0 to 2. Percentages were computed out of 84 total responses (because of 
rounding, some row totals do not exactly equal 100 for percentages). Correct responses are in 
boldface. The ps of the binomial tests comparing actual answers to a chance level of 33% are 
reported as “*”, meaning Bonferroni adjusted p < .05, “**”, meaning Bonferroni adjusted p ≤ .01, 
or “***”, meaning Bonferroni adjusted p ≤ .001. 
 
 
  Responses 
 Present-to-absent ratio Presence-consistent Absence-consistent Equiprobable 
2:2 75% (.1) *** 17% (.09) *** 8% (.06) *** 
3:2 56% (.11) *** 32% (.11) 12% (.07) *** 
Presence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 65% (.12) *** 20% (.1) ** 14% (.09) *** 
2:2 57% (.13) *** 30% (.11) 13% (.09) *** 
3:2 51% (.12) *** 38% (.12) 11% (.06) *** 
Absence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 60% (.12) *** 30% (.11) 11% (.08) *** 
2:2 45% (.12) * 31% (.12) 24% (.1)  
3:2 38% (.12) 27% (.11) 35% (.12) 
Equiprobable 
problems 
2:3 56% (.11) *** 20% (.08) ** 24% (.1)  
 
 
 
MISSING THE DOG THAT FAILED TO BARK 43
Table 4 
Percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each type of choice in each type of 
problem in Study 2. There were 18 problems (2 per cell), N = 42. The stars report the level of 
significance against chance level (set at .33): * = Bonferroni adjusted p < .05; ** = Bonferroni 
adjusted p ≤ .01; *** = Bonferroni adjusted p ≤ .001. Correct responses are in boldface. 
 
 
  Responses 
 Present-to-absent ratio Presence-consistent Absence-consistent Equiprobable 
2:2 68% (.11) *** 15% (.08) *** 17% (.09) *** 
3:2 69% (.11) *** 13% (.08) *** 18% (.1) ** 
Presence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 67% (.12) *** 20% (.1) ** 13% (.08) *** 
2:2 52% (.14) *** 23% (.1) * 25% (.11) 
3:2 63% (.12) *** 21% (.09) * 15% (.08) *** 
Absence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 62% (.13) *** 27% (.12) 11% (.07) *** 
2:2 43% (.13) * 21% (.1) * 36% (.12) 
3:2 24% (.11)  46% (.12) ** 30% (.11) 
Equiprobable 
problems 
2:3 54% (.1) *** 32% (.1) 14% (.09) *** 
 
 
 
MISSING THE DOG THAT FAILED TO BARK 44
Table 5 
Percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each type of choice in each type of 
problem in Study 3. There were 18 problems (2 per cell), N = 42. The stars report the level of 
significance against chance level (set at .33): * = Bonferroni adjusted p < .05; ** = Bonferroni 
adjusted p ≤ .01; *** = Bonferroni adjusted p < .001. Correct responses are in boldface. 
 
 
 
 
  Responses 
 Present-to-absent ratio Presence-consistent Absence-consistent Equiprobable 
2:2 65% (.12) *** 26% (.11) 8% (.06) *** 
3:2 62% (.11) *** 18% (.1) ** 20% (.1) ** 
Presence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 52% (.14) *** 26% (.12) 21% (.11) * 
2:2 52% (.14) *** 25% (.11) 21% (.11) * 
3:2 61% (.13) *** 26% (.11) 13% (.08) *** 
Absence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 57% (.13) *** 25% (.12) 18% (.1) ** 
2:2 35% (.12) 38% (.11) 27% (.1) 
3:2 27% (.11) 37% (.12) 36% (.12) 
Equiprobable 
problems 
2:3 38% (.12) 24% (.1)  37% (.12) 
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Table 6 
Percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each type of choice in each type of 
problem in the three studies. There were 18 problems (2 per cell), N = 126. The stars report the 
level of significance against chance level (set at .33): * = Bonferroni adjusted p ≤ .05; ** = 
Bonferroni adjusted p < .01; *** = Bonferroni adjusted p < .001. Correct responses are in 
boldface. 
 
 
 
  Responses 
 Present-to-absent ratio Presence-consistent Absence-consistent Equiprobable 
2:2 69% (.06) *** 19% (.06) *** 11% (.04) *** 
3:2 62% (.06) *** 21% (.06) *** 17% (.05) *** 
Presence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 62% (.07) *** 22% (.06)*** 16% (.05) *** 
2:2 54% (.08) *** 26% (.06) ** 20% (.06) *** 
3:2 58% (.07) *** 29% (.06) * 13% (.04) *** 
Absence 
consistent 
Problems 
 
2:3 60% (.07) *** 27% (.07)* 13% (.05) *** 
2:2 41% (.07) ** 30% (.06) 29% (.06) 
3:2 30% (.07) 37% (.07) 33% (.07) 
Equiprobable 
problems 
2:3 49% (.06) *** 25% (.05) ** 25% (.06) ** 
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Figure 1. Left panel. The mean number of correct responses as a function of the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3) in Study 1. Right panel. The mean number of presence-
consistent responses in Study 1 as a function of the type of problem, that is, the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3). The error bars represent the standard errors of the means 
(SEMs).  
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Figure 2. Left panel. The mean number of correct responses as a function of the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3) in Study 2. Right panel. The mean number of presence-
consistent responses in Study 2 as a function of the type of problem, that is, the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3). The error bars represent the standard errors of the means 
(SEMs). 
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Figure 3. Left panel. The mean number of correct responses as a function of the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3) in Study 3. Right panel. The mean number of presence-
consistent responses in Study 3 as a function of the type of problem, that is, the correct-response 
type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) and of the present-
to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3). The error bars represent the standard errors of the means 
(SEMs). 
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Figure 4. Left panel. The mean confidence ratings toward the correct responses in the three studies 
when the normative response was presence-consistent, absence-consistent, or equiprobable. Right 
panel. Participants’ mean confidence in each response type they gave (i.e., presence-consistent, 
absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses) in the three studies. The error bars represent the 
standard errors of the means (SEMs). 
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Figure 5. Left panel. The mean number of correct responses across the three studies as a function of 
the correct-response type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) 
and of the present-to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3). Right panel. The mean number of 
presence-consistent responses across the three studies as a function of the type of problem, that is, 
the correct-response type (i.e., presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable problems) 
and of the present-to-absent feature ratio (i.e., 2:2, 3:2; 2:3). The error bars represent the standard 
errors of the means (SEMs). 
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Appendix 
 
Instructions given to participants in the three studies (we report both the original versions in Italian 
and the English translations). 
 
ISTRUZIONI 
 
In queste pagine troverai 18 problemi riguardanti due mazzi composti da 100 carte ciascuno. In alcuni problemi, su ogni 
carta di ciascun mazzo sono riportate da 0 a 4 lettere consonanti (scelte tra B, C, D, F). In altri problemi ogni carta 
contiene da 0 a 5 lettere consonanti (scelte tra B, C, D, F, G).   
 
 
Study 1 version: 
 
 
In ogni problema una tabella descrive quante carte in ciascun mazzo riportano una data lettera. Il numero di carte che 
riportano una lettera è del tutto indipendente dal numero di carte che riportano ogni altra lettera. 
Ad esempio, una tabella come: 
 
 
 B C D F 
mazzo 1 46 21 9 38 
mazzo 2 12 88 72 56 
 
sta a indicare che nel mazzo 1, 46 carte contengono la lettera B, 21 la C, 9 la D, 38 la F. Nel mazzo 2, 12 carte 
contengono la B, 88 la C, 72 la D, e 56 la F. 
 
 
 
Study 2 version: 
 
 
In ogni problema una tabella descrive quante carte in ciascun mazzo riportano una data lettera e quante invece non la 
riportano. Il numero di carte che riportano o meno una lettera è del tutto indipendente dal numero di carte che 
riportano, o meno, ogni altra lettera. 
Ad esempio, una tabella come: 
 
 
B C D F  
sì no sì no sì no sì no 
mazzo 1 46 54 21 79 9 91 38 62 
mazzo 2 12 88 88 12 72 28 56 44 
 
 
sta a indicare che nel mazzo 1: 46 carte contengono la lettera B e 54 non la contengono, 21 carte riportano la C e 79 non 
la riportano, 9 carte contengono la D e 91 non la contengono, 38 carte contengono la F e 62 non la contengono. Inoltre, 
nel mazzo 2: 12 carte contengono la B e 88 non la contengono, 88 carte contengono la C e 12 non la contengono, 72 
carte riportano la D e 28 non la riportano, 56 carte contengono la F e 44 non la contengono. 
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Study 3 version: 
 
In ogni problema una tabella descrive quante carte in ciascun mazzo non riportano una data lettera. Il numero di carte 
che non riportano una lettera è del tutto indipendente dal numero di carte che non riportano ogni altra lettera. 
Ad esempio, una tabella come: 
 
 B C D F 
mazzo 1 54 79 91 62 
mazzo 2 88 12 28 44 
 
 
sta a indicare che nel mazzo 1, 54 carte non contengono la lettera B, 79 non riportano la C, 91 non contengono la D, 62 
non riportano la F. Nel mazzo 2, 88 carte non contengono la B, 12 non riportano la C, 28 non contengono la D, e 44 non 
riportano la F. 
 
 
Immagina che lo sperimentatore scelga a caso il mazzo da cui estrarre, a caso, una sola carta, e non ti dica di quale 
mazzo si tratti. Ti comunica, però, se e quali lettere vi siano sulla carta estratta. Ad esempio, riferendosi ai mazzi 1 e 2 
della tabella qui sopra, potrebbe dirti: “la carta che ho estratto ha una B e una F, ma non ha né la C né la D”. Una 
raffigurazione della carta, in questo esempio, potrebbe essere di questo tipo: 
 
 
F 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naturalmente, in base alle poche informazioni a disposizione non puoi stabilire con certezza da quale dei due mazzi sia 
stata estratta la carta. Tuttavia, ti viene richiesto di stabilire se, alla luce del suo contenuto, la carta è più probabilmente 
del mazzo 1 o del mazzo 2. Se in alcuni problemi non riesci a decidere di quale mazzo sia probabilmente la carta, 
rispondi che i due mazzi sono egualmente probabili.  
Nell’esempio appena riportato, la risposta corretta è la seguente: “è più probabile che la carta provenga dal mazzo 1”.  
 
In dettaglio, per ogni problema:  
- se ritieni che sia più probabile che la carta provenga dal mazzo 1, segna con una croce la casella posta sotto la 
tabella con scritto “mazzo 1”; 
- se ritieni che sia più probabile che la carta provenga dal mazzo 2, segna con una croce la casella posta sotto la 
tabella con scritto “mazzo 2”; 
- se ritieni che la probabilità di estrarre la carta dai due mazzi sia uguale, segna con una croce la casella posta 
sotto la tabella con scritto “equiprobabili”. 
 
Dopo aver risposto, indica quanto ti fidi che la tua risposta sia corretta, segnando con una croce un numero sulla scala 
numerata da 1 a 7 (1= poca fiducia; 7 = molta fiducia) che trovi alla fine di ciascun problema.  
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INSTUCTIONS 
 
In the following pages, you will be presented with 18 problems concerning two decks of cards. Each deck consists of 
100 cards. In some problems, each card of each deck shows between 0 and 4 consonants (chosen among B, C, D, F). In 
other problems, each card shows between 0 and 5 consonants (chosen among B, C, D, F, G) 
 
 
Study 1 version: 
 
 
For each problem, a table describes how many cards in each deck have a given letter printed on their face. The number 
of cards showing a letter is totally independent of the number of cards showing any other letter. 
For example, a table as the following: 
 
 B C D F 
mazzo 1 46 21 9 38 
mazzo 2 12 88 72 56 
 
 
indicates that in deck 1, 46 cards have the letter B, 21 the letter C, 9 the letter D, 38 the letter F. In deck 2, 12 cards have 
the letter B, 88 the letter C, 72 the letter D, and 56 the letter F. 
 
 
Study 2 version: 
 
 
For each problem, a table describes how many cards in each deck have a given letter printed on their face and how 
many cards do not. The number of cards showing or not showing a letter is totally independent of the number of cards 
showing, or not showing, any other letter. 
For example, a table as the following: 
 
 
B C D F  
sì no sì no sì no sì no 
mazzo 1 46 54 21 79 9 91 38 62 
mazzo 2 12 88 88 12 72 28 56 44 
 
 
indicates that in deck 1: 46 cards have the letter B and 54 do not, 21 cards have the letter C and 79 do not, 9 cards have 
the letter D and 91 do not, 38 cards have the letter F and 62 do not. Furthermore, in deck 2: 12 cards have the letter B 
and 88 do not, 88 cards have the letter C and 12 do not, 72 cards have the letter D and 28 do not, 56 cards have the letter 
F and 44 do not. 
 
 
 
Study 3 version: 
 
For each problem, a table describes how many cards in each deck do not have a given letter printed on their face. The 
number of cards that do not show a letter is totally independent of the number of cards that do not show any other 
letter. 
For example, a table as the following: 
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 B C D F 
mazzo 1 54 79 91 62 
mazzo 2 88 12 28 44 
 
 
indicates that in deck 1, 54 cards do not have the letter B, 79 do not have the C, 91 do not have the D, 62 do not have 
the F. In deck 2, 88 cards do not have the B, 12 do not have the C, 28 do not have the D, and 44 do not have the F. 
 
 
Imagine that the experimenter randomly chooses the deck from which to draw, at random, only one card, without 
telling you which deck she selected. However, she tells you which letters, if any, are printed on the drawn card. For 
example, with reference to the decks 1 and 2 of the table above, she could tell you: “the card I drew has a B and an F, 
but it has neither a C nor a D”.  A picture of the card, in this example, could be as the following: 
 
 
F 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, based on the limited information available you cannot determine with certainty from which of the two decks 
the card was drawn. However, based on the content of the card, you are requested to determine whether the card 
belongs more likely to deck 1 or to deck 2. If in some problems you cannot decide from which deck the card was more 
likely drawn, you will answer that the two decks are equiprobable. 
In the example above, the correct answer is the following: “it is more probable that the card has been drawn from deck 
1”. 
 
In detail, in each problem: 
- if you deem that it is more likely that the card has been drawn from deck 1, mark a cross in the box “deck 1” 
located under the table. 
- if you deem that it is more likely that the card has been drawn from deck 2, mark a cross in the box “deck 2” 
located under the table. 
- if you deem that it is equally likely that the card has been drawn from deck 1 and deck 2, mark a cross in the 
box “equiprobable” located under the table.  
 
After making your decision, indicate how much you are confident in the accuracy of your answer. Mark a cross on a 1-
to-7 rating scale (1 = not confident; 7 = very confident), which you find at the end of each problem.  
 
 
